enacted instead of being known

Consciousness establishes between the I and the representation a relation much more profound than that which appears in the expression ‘I have a representation’: it relates the representation to the I as if to a free faculty which does not allow itself to be confined within any one of its products, but for which each product is already thought and recognised as past, the occasion of a determinant change in inner meaning. When the consciousness of knowledge or the working through of memory is missing, the knowledge in itself is only the repetition of its object: it is played, that is to say repeated, enacted instead of being known. Repetition here appears as the unconscious of the free concept, of knowledge or of memory, the unconscious of representation.

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Introduction, p16

If we ask ‘do inanimate objects play-act’ in the light of this statement we see that there is no consciousness or unconsciousness of knowledge in an object-thing. object-things lack even the incapacity necessary to be considered to merely play at something.