Do inanimate objects play-act? Bloch/Deleuze & Guattari: the force of machinic performance

Something else makes things suspect even while they stand before our gaze.  At the theatre, if the candles in the last act of Wallenstein are burning on the table, say, and Wallenstein undersigns the treaty with Wrangel: then the candles and the table are truly candles and table – they’re not play acting.  They weren’t the same ones, but they were candles and table no differently when Wallenstein in fact signed himself over to the actual general.  Yet the people presently around the candles and desk – the present actors – are play-acting; why, then, does no fissure open? Why does the audience, illusion here, illusion there, sense no different levels of sincerity? Do inanimate objects play-act? On the stage does their pretense, far from creating a fissure, have a homogeneous space? 
From Bloch, ‘The Reverse of Things’, Traces, Stanford University Press, 2006, p135

A partial object is not representative, even though it admittedly serves as the basis of relations and as a means of assigning agents a place and a function; but these agents are not persons, any more than these relations are intersubjective. They are relations of production as such, and agents of production and anti-production.
Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p50-51

Bloch and Deleuze & Guattari shows us the existence of the fissure between actors and non-actors & the power of performance to paper-over this crack.  There is an absolute divide between people and things because objects do not play-act. Even if they serve ‘as the basis of relations and as a means of assigning agents a place and a function’  the object is at best the grit in the oyster of machinic interaction.